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Tradeoff Analysis for Combat Service Support Wireless 
Communications Alternatives 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The Combat Service Support  (CSS) community has an urgent operational requirement to 
send data between Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) and 
Army Battle Command Systems. As the Army moves toward more mobile and agile 
forces and continued sustainment of numerous high-cost legacy STAMIS, the 
requirement for wireless connectivity and a wireless network to the CSS supporting 
organizations has become ever more critical.  There are currently several Army 
communications initiatives underway to resolve this wireless connectivity issue. 
However, to fully appreciate and understand the value of these initiatives to the CSS 
community, a Tradeoff Analysis is needed to examine the various on-going Service 
wireless CSS communication initiatives and Commercial alternatives.  The Army is faced 
with an immediate near-term wireless CSS communication connectivity issue, which 
must be resolved now.  The present study seeks to identify and assess solutions. 
 
The present study has identified the following issues that impede Interim Brigade Combat 
Team (IBCT) communication system integration: 
• Legacy logistic STAMIS are difficult to configure for a network environment  
• Existing tactical network support structure does not support unclassified data. 
• Distance between the CRT and the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) is typically 
outside the existing data communication range. 
• The IBCT system architecture is unique and is evolving. 
 
To enable the IBCT to send data between STAMIS systems and Army battle command 
systems, logistics communications systems are needed that meet the following “core” 
requirements: 
 
1. Support a light force with a small footprint 
2. Low density of technical support required 
3. Supports split-basing and interim staging bases 
4. Supports unclassified data network for the forward CRT  
5. Support Unit Level Logistics System–Ground (ULLS-G) functionality in the CRT 
forward 
6. CRT Communications work in all terrain conditions 
7. CRT Communications system is integrated with other enablers 
 
We refer to these as “core” requirements that any acceptable solution must satisfy.  
Additional factors that should be used to discriminate among possible alternative wireless 
communications architectures are bandwidth/transmission rates and transmission range.  
These requirements and performance factors were used as criteria in identifying gaps in 
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technology and to assess the potential for various technology options to fill these gaps in 
establishing a workable CSS Communication solution for the IBCT.   
 
The following CSS wireless alternatives were examined as possible solutions for the 
IBCT CSS Communication problems: 
 
Current Baseline.  The CRT and its STAMIS systems will be located in the Brigade 
Support Area (BSA). If the CRT deploys forward, the STAMIS system will remain in the 
BSA. The CRT will provide updates to the ULLS-G system via FBCB2.  
 
Option 1—SINCGARS (ASIP). Utilizes the Single Channel Ground and Airborne 
Radio System (SINCGARS) ASIP (Advanced SINCGARS Improvement Program) 
radios located in the brigade to transmit logistics data. This solution requires additional 
Windows OS computers, communication software, and a non-standard interface cable. It 
is not recommended as a primary means of communication because of its cumbersome 
configuration and slow transfer speed.   
 
Option 2—Interim Wireless.  Interim solution involving Wireless Combat Service 
Support Automated Information System Interface (CAISI), Near Term Digital Radio 
(NTDR), and an In-Line Network Encryption (INE) device (TACLANE).  The 
combination of these systems would provide the logistician with near real time secure 
data processing without degrading the tactical command and control network. This would 
require reorganization of assets within the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) and 
would require the use of additional INEs.   
 
Option 3—Cellular Satellite Communication.  Utilize cellular satellite 
communications and replace the current legacy STAMIS communication software to 
enable connectivity with wireless technology.   Satellite communications eliminates hand 
carrying of diskettes (sneaker nets) from the BSA and the CRT.   
 
Option 4—3rd Generation Wireless Technology.  Future Fix/Objective or long-term 
solution involving an upgrade to CAISI Wireless system and Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) cellular technology.  Third generation wireless technology achieves a 
2.4 Mbs transmission rate, and CDMA cellular technology achieves a BSA range of 6-12 
Km. 
 
Option 1 provides wireless connectivity between the BSA and the CRT, but does not 
provide a complete solution since STAMIS limitations require sneaker net within the 
BSA and the CRT.  Option 2 provides an interim wireless solution that eliminates 
sneaker net, but still suffers from terrain and distance limits.  Option 3 provides cellular 
satellite communications that support data and voice and eliminate the terrain and 
distance constraints.  Option 4 uses third generation wireless technology (digital cellular 
within the BSA and satellite between the BSA and CRT).  Options 3 and 4 offer clear 
advantages and, though they are not being considered for IBCT-1 or IBCT-2, they should 
be considered for later IBCTs.    
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Tradeoff Analysis for Combat Service Support Wireless 
Communications Alternatives 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem and Background 
 
The CSS community has an urgent operational requirement to send data between 
Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) and Army Battle 
Command Systems. As the Army moves toward more mobile and agile forces and 
continued sustainment of numerous high-cost legacy STAMIS systems, the requirement 
for wireless connectivity and a wireless network to the CSS supporting organizations has 
become ever more critical. Wireless connectivity is essential between the Warfighter’s 
Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) and the battalion and brigade level CSS 
organizations. Several Army communications initiatives are underway to resolve this 
wireless connectivity issue. However, to fully appreciate and understand the value of 
these initiatives to the Combat Service Support (CSS) community, a Tradeoff Analysis is 
needed to examine the various on-going Service wireless CSS communications initiatives 
and Commercial alternatives (e.g. Web-Enabled, Satellite, Cellular, or a Combination).  
The required study should identify the most feasible and cost effective immediate near-
term wireless CSS communications alternatives, and provide a proposed “first-order” 
(high level) wireless CSS communications operational architecture that will support the 
vision of the Revolution in Military Logistics (RML), the Distribution Based Logistics 
System objectives, and the army transformation. 
 
It should be noted that the communications technologies and future Army communication 
systems, such as the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) currently under 
development, are expected to resolve the CSS assured communications issue in the mid-
far term (5-10 years).  However, the Army is faced with an immediate near-term wireless 
CSS communications connectivity issue, which must be resolved now. The Army's vision 
to reduce the logistics footprint cannot be achieved without this CSS connectivity. 
 
The CSS Communications Tradeoff Analysis will yield the following benefits: 
 
• The analysis fully supports and is essential to effectively executing the Army 
Strategic Logistics Plan (ASLP) and the Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics 
(DCSLOG) RML, Distribution-Based Logistics System (DBLS), and Embedded 
Diagnostics and Prognostics Synchronization (EDAPS) initiatives that support the 
Army transformation in achieving the Objective Force.  
 
• The First Order CSS Communication Operational Architecture will identify the 
potential resources required to establish a near term wireless CSS communication 
network for moving logistics information from the platform to the Weapon 
System Manager.  
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• The analysis will assist the Army to become more responsive, deployable, agile, 
versatile, survivable and sustainable. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
The CSS Communications Tradeoff Analysis has the following objectives, which are 
focused on the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT): 
 
1. Identify, define and clearly delineate wireless CSS communication connectivity 
requirements that are essential in developing an interim CSS wireless architecture. 
2. Identify and compare currently available wireless communication technologies that 
could be implemented to solve the wireless connectivity issue between the 
Warfighter’s Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) and the battalion and brigade 
level CSS organizations. 
3. Evaluate these wireless communication technologies to determine the most feasible 
and cost effective wireless communication connectivity solution for transmitting 
logistics information from the Platform to the Combat Service Support Control 
System (CSSCS), STAMIS systems and to the Weapon System Manager. 
4. Describe a "First-Order" wireless CSS operational communication architecture 
that will identify how these wireless communication technologies could support the 
CSS community from the Platform to the Weapon System Manager using best 
business practices. 
5. Brief LIA on CSS Communications initiative at Ft. Lewis.  PNNL’s 
Communication Task Force member at Ft. Lewis cell will provide near-term and mid-
term briefing to LIA staff on the Ft. Lewis CSS Communications architecture and 
initiatives for the IBCT. 
6. Coordinate this effort with ongoing Logistics Command and Control Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration  (LOGC2 ACTD) at CECOM by 
collaborating with the LOGC2 ACTD Program Manager at CECOM. 
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2. IBCT Tactical Internet 
2.1 Notional System Concept 
The term Tactical Internet (TI) refers to both the physical communications network that 
provides the data backbone and the conceptual integrated combat zone information 
infrastructure.  The TI is designed to electronically connect all users to critical Command 
and Control (C2) Systems and Situational Awareness (SA) architecture information.  The 
TI is the integration of tactical radios and routers to form a voice and data network that 
transports C2 and SA data for tactical users.  Principal TI equipment is shown in Figure 
2-1.  Current primary systems using TI are Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and 
Below (FBCB2) and Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control and Intelligence 
(FAADC2I). The TI extends existing digital communications from brigade headquarters 
to the foxhole. The TI is an integrated part of the Warfighter Information Network (WIN) 
providing digital communication to all echelons (Foxhole to Power Projection Sustaining 
Base).  As the TI matures, plans are to provide digital transport services to all Battlefield 
Functional Areas (BFA). The TI uses JTA-A compliant protocols. 
 
 
The current notional concept of the TI includes several distinct layers, as shown in Figure 
2-2.  The top layer is made up of Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) multi-channel 
satellite systems and existing tactical packet node (TPN) system. The MSE and TPN 
structure will transition to WIN-T as that program matures and is fielded. The lower TI is 
the communication support system for units found at the brigade, company and below 
level. Equipment such as FBCB2 computers, Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
Systems (EPLRS), and SINGCARS radios are networked to make up the lower TI 
structure. 
 
The upper TI uses all available in-theater communications assets to enable the corps, 
division, brigade, and battalions to communicate and share information.  The upper TI 
makes use of existing MSE and TPN components containing Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode (ATM) technologies, Near-Term Tactical Radio (NTDR), and multi channel secure 
satellite systems such as Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T) 
and the Tri-band Advanced Range Extension Terminal. 
Figure 2-1 Principal Tactical Internet
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The lower half of the TI provides the C2 communications path for Brigade, Battalion and 
company level operations inside the theatre combat zone.  The lower TI uses FBCB2 host 
computers and Appliqué and Embedded battle command (EBC) software. The 
communications path for the lower half of the TI is provided by EPLRS, NTDR and 
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), with RS-232 
interface.  FBCB2 also provides the combat service support functionality for CSS 
situational awareness.  The FBCB2 CSS functionality includes the following: logistics 
situational reports (LOGSITREP), personnel situation report (PERSITREP), supply point 
and field services status report, command tracked item list update message (CTIL-BRIL), 
task management suite (including call for support), and other reports.  The FBCB2 also 
provides for limited free-text messages.  Figure 2-3 shows the tactical Logistics 
Communication architecture for the IBCT. 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2-3, the Combat Trains Command Post  (CTCP) consists of the 
Administrative Logistics Operations Center (ALOC), the Combat Repair Team (CRT) 
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and the Battalion Aid Station (BAS).  The CTCP is located 25-26 Km forward of the 
Brigade Support Area (BSA).   All vehicles within the CRT are FBCB2 equipped.  
Equipment status reports are transmitted simultaneously to the CRT and the CSSCS 
system located within the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).  In addition, the ALOC uses 
NTDR communications to transmit classified data to support the S1-S4 shop and the 
CSSCS workstation.  The FBCB2 provides free text message capability across a 
classified network.   
2.2 Current configuration of IBCT Tactical Internet  
 
The IBCT Signal Company provides the strong C2 communications backbone required to 
support distributed operations within urban and complex terrain across potentially 
significant distances, as well as the linkages required for effective communications with 
division and higher echelons. 
 
The communications system within the IBCT is founded on a TI consisting of EPLRS, 
SINCGARS, NTDR, and routers.  The TI provides secure, jam resistant, on the move, 
non-line of sight, long range, data communications for multiple subnets while operating 
in a frequency-constrained environment.  Internal IBCT communications systems support 
stationary and on the move distribution of data across the tactical communications 
network two echelons up and two echelons down (to include: adjacent, joint and allied 
units).  The communication system links with a selectable set of external information and 
Reconnaissance Surveillance Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms, adjacent, supported, 
and supporting units according to mission needs and Theater/National architectures.  
International communications interoperability is required and essential. 
 
The IBCT communications system and network are open and modular in construction.  
This open architecture facilitates future growth/modification to the internal network 
system.  The open architecture also facilitates the addition or deletion of many different 
types of communication devices (to include Joint/Combined and Coalition systems) into 
the internal network.  This flexibility is the foundation that allows the IBCT to exchange 
information with Joint, Combined and Coalition forces. 
 
Dispersed operations require the IBCT’s C2 support network to rely upon several means 
of range extension to maintain information connectivity within the IBCT.  Tactical 
satellite assets provide responsive, high bandwidth voice, video and data support to the 
IBCT’s command elements.  At the Commander’s direction, TACSAT (Tactical 
Communications Satellite) can provide intra-IBCT “enclave” connectivity, as required.  
TI range extension provides maneuver and RSTA C4ISR (Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) network 
support across complex terrain via airborne platforms such as the Airborne 
Communications Node (CAN) and Tactical Unmanned Airborne Vehicle (TUAV).  The 
IBCT maintains TI retransmission (RETRANS) assets to support operations from within 
secured locations to realize economies in force protection.  If required, these assets 
provide critical range extension capability in the event of failure or absence of airborne 
platforms.  Finally, the preferred IBCT radio systems execute multi-point relay of data.  
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In essence, each member of individual data networks serve as a RETRANS means to 
transfer C4ISR data across the combat zone. 
2.3 Issues  
 
Some of the issues associated with the IBCT TI are doctrinal support of the unclassified 
infrastructure, limited technical support for the unclassified infrastructure, and lack of 
unclassified infrastructure for the combat zone. 
 
Classified-to-unclassified interface.  The current Tactical C4ISR architecture was 
designed to support a secret and higher infrastructure. The current STAMIS family of 
applications is not certified to run at the secret level, and the higher echelon systems that 
STAMIS has to communicate with are also unclassified.  Currently, there does not exist a 
seamless automated process to move unclassified logistic data to and from the classified 
network. Technology does exist that can be configured and certified to pass this type of 
information between networks (e.g., secure GateGuard is a remote automatic digital 
network, or AUTODIN, terminal, which operates on desktop and laptop personal 
computers). However, this technology requires a heavy system administration overhead.  
Finally, because there is no plan to upgrade STAMIS security requirements, actual 
transfer of information between networks will continue to be done by means of manual 
re-keying or hand-carrying of diskette (sneaker net). 
 
Limited technical staff to support unclassified network infrastructure.  To make 
STAMIS work in the tactical environment, several fixes have been put into place but are 
not supported by official doctrine.  The Logistic community has procured several quick 
initiatives to place into service an interim unclassified network infrastructure with 
minimal organization support structure.   For example, the Combat Service Support 
Automated Information System Interface (CAISI) unclassified network infrastructure 
introduced additional support items such as the NES (Network Encryption System), an 
unclassified DNS (Domain Name Server).  The burden of supporting these systems for 
the IBCT falls on the S6 (Communications Staff Officer). 
 
Lack of unclassified infrastructure for the combat zone.  Predominantly, forward 
elements such as the CRT and Mobile Repair Team have only classified communications.  
The only way to transmit the unclassified logistics information from the CRT is via clear 
text messages, voice transmissions, or sneaker net to the unclassified CAISI/STAMIS 
systems located within the BSA.   
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3. IBCT Logistics Information System Distribution and 
Supporting Communications 
3.1 Notional System Concept  
 
This section provides an overview of the IBCT Organizational and Operational (O&O) 
concept, as described in Chapter 10 of the IBCT O&O Plan [2].   
 
BSB Mission Description 
The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) provides centrally managed, distribution-based 
combat service support (CSS) to the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to sustain its 
operational employment in joint contingencies.  The BSB executes a unique, execution-
focused concept of support that is fully integrated with the Brigade concept of operations 
and scheme of maneuver.  In accordance with its focus on execution, BSB support 
operations are characterized by continuous adaptation and creative tailoring, based on 
unit operational tempos, commander-designated priorities for support, and the frequently 
changing requirements of the combat zone.  Through centralized management and CSS 
situational understanding, the BSB combines unit level distribution and area supply 
points to insure that services and supplies are delivered where, and as they are needed.  
This coordination allows the IBCT to synchronize logistical rhythm with the battle 
rhythm.  Logistical flexibility and dynamic tasking of BSB support elements typify BSB 
operations.  The unit’s effectiveness depends on continuous integration of operational and 
logistical planning; employment of the latest advances in CSS command and control; 
enhanced CSS situational understanding; information fusion; and considerable scaling 
and augmentation to accomplish its mission.  This scaling and augmentation may be 
provided through joint, multinational, host nation, or commercial sources. 
 
Operationally, the IBCT is doctrinally portrayed to fight under a division.  The IBCT can 
also fight under the direct control of a corps headquarters, within a joint or combined 
command.  As such, the BSB will normally be connected to a higher echelon level of 
CSS, either directly or through reach (or reachback) operations.  Reachback is the 
electronic ability to exploit resources that are not located with the deployed unit, thus 
enhancing the operational agility of the unit by improving its access to timely and 
relevant information [3].  Reachback linkages of the BSB are referred to as “echelons 
above brigade” (EAB), and include, as appropriate, any organization from which the BSB 
would gain the next higher level of CSS support. 
 
The BSB is the base organization from which CSS force packages are tailored for each 
contingency.  It is strategically, operationally, and tactically mobile and focused on the 
sustainment demands dictated by each specific contingency.  It is capable of both 
providing a smaller element of itself to support a single battalion task force, and receiving 
a combat service support company (CSSC) to supplement the CSS capability for the 
IBCT.  CSS is structured to optimize the use of CSS resources (through CSS situational 
understanding and the IBCT common operating picture) and minimize the operational 
and CSS footprint in the area of operations.  Maximizing internal lift capabilities and 
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exploiting the commonality of combat and support vehicles and their systems will 
enhance logistics support and reduce both deployment and sustainment requirements 
 
 
IBCT CSS Roles & Responsibilities 
To achieve collaborated and coordinated operations between maneuver and CSS, it is 
important that an operational framework of roles and responsibilities exits throughout the 
IBCT.  The following is a list of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) organizations and their 
key roles and responsibilities: 
 
• BCT S1 & Section—provides personnel accounting, casualty reporting, medical 
platoon management, and advice to the BCT Commander on personnel issues. 
• BCT S4 & Section—serves as BCT Commander’s principal logistics planner. 
• BCT S3 & Section—collaborates with BCT S4 and BSB SPO during MDMP to 
determine COA CSS supportability and feasibility, selects/manages supply routes, air 
routes, medevac routes, and terrain for logistics operations.   
• BCT Surgeon—focal point of all medical care within the BCT. 
• BSB Cdr—principle logistics operator for the IBCT. 
• BSB SPO & Section—establishes daily logistics plan and synchronization matrix, 
planning both current and future logistics operations; advises BSB CDR on 
requirements and available assets; resolves logistical support problems; manages 
CSSCS. 
• BSB S4 & Section—Area Support Planner for BSA, BSB Logistics Planner. 
• BSB S1 & Section—principle Personnel Services planner to the BSB Commander. 
• HDC Company Commander—focal point of all sustainment distribution within the 
BCT.  
• FMC Company Commander—focal point of all maintenance within the BCT; 
executes the BCT and BSB Commanders’ maintenance plan; provides area support 
within the BSA. 
• BSMC Company Commander--provides area medical support to the BSA. 
• Battalion/Squadron S4 & Section—principle CSS planner to the battalion 
commander. 
• Battalion/Squadron S3 & Section—collaborates with Bn/Sqdn S4, BCT S4 and BSB 
SPO to synchronize CSS and maneuver operations; selects/manages supply routes, air 
routes, medevac routes, and terrain for logistics operations within battalion/squadron 
AO. 
• Battalion S1 & Section—principal personnel services planner to the Bn Cdr 
• Battalion/Squadron HHC/HHT/HSB Cdrs—responsible for Bn/Sqdn TOC life 
support mission. 
• Battalion HHC Xos--functions as the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) under the 
supervision of the Bn/Sqdn S4. 
• Bn/Sqdn HHC/HHT/HSB 1SGs— Company level “CSS Manager” responsible for 
the health and welfare of soldiers; facilitates area support to all elements in the 
Battalion Area; assists in coordination for sustainment support and delivery to 
separates and to platoons  
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• Unit (Line Co) 1SGs— Company level “CSS Manager” responsible for the health and 
welfare of soldiers; directs and supervises sustainment deliveries to platoons; 
maintains visibility over unit log status. 
• Company/Troop/Battery Supply Sergeants—coordinates company supply functions. 
• Platoon Sergeants—typically, the data point of entry for all platoon CSS information; 
initiates requests for supplies and manages the receipt and transfer of supplies for his 
platoon. 
• Squad Leaders—identifies and forwards squad requirements to Platoon Sergeant. 
 
Concept of Support Operations 
The BSB executes a unique, execution-focused concept of support that is fully integrated 
with the Brigade concept of operations and scheme of maneuver.  Combat service support 
is performed as far forward as possible, given the tactical situation.  Other 
considerations—beyond Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, Civilians (METT-
TC)—include distance and volume of sustainment required. 
 
The BSB commander is the BCT commander’s senior logistician and serves as the single 
CSS operator for support to the IBCT.  His battle staff monitors and manages sustainment 
operations through an array of digital information systems and other technological 
innovations.  Superior situational understanding, provided by such systems as Global 
Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-A), Combat Service Support Control System 
[CSSCS], Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below [FBCB2], and Movement 
Tracking System [MTS] permits CSS commanders and staff to actively anticipate BCT 
support requirements throughout operations. 
 
Communication linkages between STAMIS systems represent important enablers of the 
IBCT mission.  To facilitate rapid and efficient transfer of information, STAMIS systems 
located both inside and outside of the BSA must be able to send and receive data 
electronically.  For example, the Combat Repair Teams (CRT) and the Battalion Aid 
Stations (BAS) that are located forward in the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) 
must be able to send and receive data from other BCT organizations located in the BSA. 
CSS elements will have a common relevant operating picture of the battlefield and its 
sustainment requirements provided by FBCB2 and CSSCS, which will enable CSS 
commanders and battle staffs to anticipate, plan and execute support requirements and 
maximize battlefield distribution.  This will require CSS units to have early and 
continuous access to robust communications networks such as the Warfighter 
Information Network, that enable them to review and pass information from support 
elements to theater or continental US providers. 
 
The fundamental principles supporting this concept are: 
• Execution-centric Support.  Execution-centric support encompasses the intent to 
provide CSS support that can be continuously adapted to IBCT and sub-unit 
operations even as they are being executed, while simultaneously building combat 
power for the next battle. 
• Anticipatory Logistics.  Anticipatory logistics expands the concept of execution-
focused support beyond the current or immediate sustainment requirements to include 
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the anticipation of requirements that can be predicted and planned with accuracy.  
Anticipatory logistics can be based on several factors including: operational plans and 
orders; demand history; prognostics and diagnostics; advanced planning and 
scheduling; operational experience; BCT usage rates; and fleet management. 
• Unity of Command and Control.  The principle of unity of command is combined 
with unity of effort to insure positive, effective command and control of CSS 
operations within the IBCT.   
• Centralized Management.  CSS assets within IBCT units are designed to minimize 
CSS deployment requirements and in-theater infrastructure.  Given that design 
parameter and the likelihood that the IBCT will be operating in a non-contiguous 
combat zone over a large AO, the BSB centrally manages its resources and operations 
in order to maximize the support that can be provided in accordance with the BCT 
commander’s priorities.  As a result, most services and support are provided without 
dedicating BSB resources to specific units.  (Typical exceptions to this rule are the 
maintenance combat repair teams (CRT) and the medical support structure.)   
•  Area Support: The key principle behind area support requires that the “separate” 
units, which are operating within a battalion area, but are not organic to that battalion, 
receive their sustainment and maintenance from local higher headquarters.  Under the 
area support concept, the BSB will typically deliver sustainment to all units operating 
within a particular geographical area at the same time in order to optimize delivery.  
Additionally, maintenance CRTs will typically support all units within their 
geographical area in accordance with the priorities and time, personnel and equipment 
available. 
• Distribution Based Logistics.  Distribution-based logistics leverages information, 
force structure designs, technological enablers, and command and control 
relationships achieve the capability of delivering the “right stuff, at the right time, to 
the right location.”  This ability, combined with increased speed of movement and 
responsiveness throughout the system, will allow the Army to eliminate large “just-
in-case” stockpiles that were relied upon in the past.  However, distribution-based 
logistics does not eliminate the need for or the use of stockpiled inventory.  
Distribution-based logistics uses anticipation and visibility of the inventory moving 
through the distribution pipeline, in effect making the distribution pipeline into 
another warehouse, to limit, but not eliminate, stockpiled inventories. 
• Unit Level Distribution.  The BSB will provide the distribution of supplies and 
services to company, troop and battery level.  Generally, distribution to infantry 
battalions is provided to company/team level.  Distribution to other units will be 
executed on an area support basis and will normally occur at the same time as the 
parent battalion under the current task organization of units.  Typically, distribution 
points are established for a specified period of time and a single point will serve 
several different units and/or serve as a materiel collection point. 
• Tactical Tailoring/Dynamic Support. CSS operations are continuously adjusted 
through routine, tactical tailoring of BSB support assets, appropriately task-organized 
on a temporary basis to meet the current or projected near-term sustainment 
requirements.  For example, a typical distribution day may include distribution to a 
battalion level distribution point for one customer cluster, to company/battery level 
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for another customer cluster and all the way to platoon/team level for a third cluster, 
while the fourth cluster receives no delivery that particular day. 
• Configured Loads. The IBCT concept of support is based on distribution of unit-
configured loads.  The requirement to provide unit-configured loads will shift a 
significant portion of sustainment activities to units located outside the IBCT AO. 
Configured loads facilitate rapid replenishment and sustainment while simultaneously 
minimizing workload requirements within the IBCT.  Successful implementation of 
configured loads requires situational awareness and the ability to make appropriate 
forecasts at various points on the planning time continuum.  The intent of configured 
loads is to a) increase throughput, b) minimize handling, c) reduce footprint and d) 
physically speed the flow of supplies to the consumer. 
• Replace Forward Maintenance.  Repair and maintenance requirements within the 
BSB are based on the two-tiered maintenance concept.  On-system tasks, those tasks 
that do not require disassembly of components off the system, will be performed 
forward in the combat zone as the supported unit’s battle rhythm permits.  A principle 
task of the CRTs is to assess and report maintenance requirements to the FMC.  
Normally, CRTs will perform battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR), and up 
to component and major assembly replacement in the forward area.  Combat 
platforms and systems deemed unsuitable for repair forward will be recovered to the 
BSA for repair and may be replaced with “ready-to-fight” replacements. 
• Fusion of CSS and Operational Situational Understanding.  CSS situational 
understanding enables the BSB commander and staff to maintain visibility of current 
and projected requirements, to synchronize movement and material management, and 
to maintain integrated end-to-end visibility of transportation assets and supplies.  
GCSS-A, CSSCS, MTS, and FBCB2 are the battle command systems that will be 
fielded with the BSB (and other IBCT administrative and logistics elements) to insure 
effective CSS situational understanding.  These systems enable CSS commanders and 
battle staffs to exercise centralized management, anticipate support requirements, and 
maximize battlefield distribution. 
• Synchronization of Battle Rhythm and Logistical Operations.  Support operations are 
fully integrated with the IBCT battle rhythm through integrated planning and 
oversight of ongoing operations.  Logistical and operational planning occurs 
simultaneously rather than sequentially.  Incrementally adjusting either the maneuver 
or logistics plan during its execution must be visible to all IBCT elements.  The 
integration of battle rhythm and logistical operations may be enhanced significantly 
by the collocation of battalion/squadron CTCPs with or in proximity to the BSB HQ. 
• Reach Operations.  The BSB is organized to exploit capabilities external to the IBCT 
through reach operations.  Reach operations include, but are not limited to external 
sources of information and intelligence, logistical planning and analysis conducted 
outside the AO, and telemedicine.  The BSB exploits regionally available resources 
through joint, multinational, host nation, or contract sources for certain bulk supplies 
and services. 
 
BSB Organization  
The BSB consists of the headquarters and three companies: the Headquarters and 
Distribution Company (HDC), the Forward Maintenance Company (FMC), and the 
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Brigade Support Medical Company (BSMC); see Figure 3-1.  Their fundamental 
capabilities are described below. 
 
 
 
 
 
The headquarters of the BSB provides command and control of the BSB’s execution-
based logistical operations IAW the commander’s intent and the IBCT concept of 
operations.  It includes a multi-functional staff organized on traditional doctrinal lines, 
but executing a set of staff procedures unique to the BSB and IBCT mission 
requirements.  Organizing its efforts in accordance with sustainment priorities established 
by the IBCT commander, the BSB commander and staff operate on a 24-hour basis, 
adjusting and tailoring CSS support as required by METT-TC.  Planning capabilities 
cover the doctrinal functions inherent within existing tactical logistical headquarters, 
although planning/analytical support in some areas is obtained through reach-back.  
 
The HDC has the capability to provide 24-hour transportation support to the brigade.  
Overall, the HDC provides supply support for Class I (subsistence), Class II 
(organizational clothing and individual equipment), Class III (P) (packaged POL 
products); Class IV (barrier material only), Class V (ammunition, including bulk), Class 
VI (personal demand items), Class VII (major end items), and Class IX (repair parts) to 
the brigade. 
 
The FMC provides maintenance support to units within the brigade through its combat 
repair teams (CRTs), automotive repair platoon and maintenance support platoon IAW 
the two-tiered system explained previously.  Based on METT-TC, BCT OPTEMPO, and 
in keeping with the replace forward/fix rear doctrine, the preferred course of action is to 
perform maintenance, primarily consisting of LRU, component and major assembly 
Figure 3-1. Brigade Support Battalion 
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replacement as close to the supported customer as possible.  Field maintenance within the 
BSA does not include services and will typically not include extended-duration repairs.  
Primary methods of returning systems to mission-capable status include component 
replacement through the use of combat spares, BDAR kits, controlled 
substitution/cannibalization, and end-item “ready-to-fight” replacements.  The company 
is capable of performing primarily component and major assembly replacement repairs 
for artillery-specific equipment, power generation, wheeled/tracked vehicles, hull, engine 
and power trains, armament, ground support and engineer equipment, missile and 
electronics, basic sight assemblies, radios, and special electronic devices.  Limited 
capability exists to repair computers (ABCS, STAMIS), radars and LRUs.  The company 
also performs limited recovery and classification functions. 
 
The BSMC provides level II combat health support (CHS) to those IBCT elements with 
organic medical support.  The company provides, on an area basis, both level I and II 
CHS to units without organic CHS assets.  Organic capabilities include treatment of 
wounds, injuries, and disease; ground evacuation; dental care; Class VIII resupply to 
medical platoons; blood management; patient holding services; mental health support; 
and reconstitution/regeneration of supported medical platoons.  No organic aerial 
evacuation assets are present within the structure, but they will be employed when 
available through EAB.  Preventive medicine (PVNTMED) services provided include 
field hygiene and sanitation oversight and coordination, deployment medical surveillance 
of disease and non-battle injury as well as environment hazards such as the presence and 
effects of NBC and toxic industrial material hazards. 
 
3.2 Initial IBCT Implementation 
 
The IBCT concept has created a force of highly mobile logisticians that rely heavily on 
STAMIS connectivity from its forward CRTs to the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB). 
The ability to effectively pass logistics information from these forward elements is 
essential in maintaining IBCT combat power and STAMIS system integrity. Identifying 
these requirements and providing short, mid, and long-term communications solutions is 
vital for combat zone and garrison logistics.   
 
In November the IBCT identified that the brigade Combat Repair Teams would deploy 
forward of the BSA and therefore established the requirement to connect logistic 
automation systems using the tactical communications network. This requirement 
identified a shortfall in the communication systems architecture and presents a significant 
problem in the way the BSB supports the brigade.  
 
Current Log STAMIS automation systems—e.g., Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS); 
Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS); Standard Army Retail Supply System 
(SARSS)—operate independently with limited interface and no real time interoperability 
between systems. Because the current Information Exchange Requirement (IER) does not 
support STAMIS systems forward of the BSA the communication between these systems 
is normally reduced to sneaker nets.  
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3.3 Issues 
 
Some of the issues associated with logistics connectivity are STAMIS locations, 
information flow between systems with different security classification, communication 
equipment availability, and bandwidth requirements. 
   
Log STAMIS locations on the Battle Field.   The CRT ULLS & SAMS equipment will 
be co-located in the battalion CTCPs, approximately 25 kilometers forward of the BSA.  
STAMIS equipment have been consolidated and downsized to laptops, which makes it 
easier for a single operator to move and operate forward of the BSA.  All systems outside 
the capability of wireless CAISI (5-8 km) will have to use some type of non-standard 
disk transfer (FBCB2) to pass logistics information back and forth to forward logistics 
elements.  
 
Support for systems operating at different classification levels.  Although the Log 
STAMIS connectivity issues within the IBCT have been focused around the maintenance 
and supply systems (ULLS/SAMS)—which are unclassified—the brigade will eventually 
need to connect seamlessly to ULLS-4 and classified information sources such as 
CSSCS, SIDPERS (Standard Installation/Division Personnel System), and MC4 (Medical 
Communications for Combat Casualty Care). This will impact bandwidth requirements 
and will likely increase equipment authorizations.  This also would require secure 
systems and infrastructure. 
 
Communication Equipment Availability.  Currently the brigade does not have the 
equipment authorized by the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to 
create a seamless logistics communication system. Because the current O&O Plan was 
developed on the premise that GCSS-A would be available, the MTOE developers 
assumed the Log STAMIS systems would be co-located in the BSA. When GCSS-A was 
delayed and the IBCT decided to send the CRTs forward with STAMIS systems, they 
created an unanticipated gap in the communication architecture. Until the communication 
void is fixed and a seamless communication system is developed, the brigade will be 
forced to use slow, non-standard and outdated communication techniques: e.g., disk 
transfers, FBCB2 text messaging, and FM blast utilizing the Advanced SINCGARS 
Improvement Program (ASIP) radio.  Appendix B discusses a proposed standard network 
communications protocol for STAMIS. 
  
Bandwidth Requirements.  Log STAMIS bandwidth requirements have not been 
quantified and will continue to expand as new systems are fielded. Based on recent 
discussions with POE STAMIS and DISC4, the Army has decided to wait until 2008 and 
the fielding of WIN-T to fix all log STAMIS bandwidth.  Although WIN-T has the 
potential to fix the current logistics communication problem, no one agency has looked at 
the total requirements. All WIN-T requirements for log STAMIS are based on the 
optimistic deployment of GCSS-A and the supporting systems architecture. The risk 
associated with this approach is that initial deployment of WIN-T might not meet future 
STAMIS bandwidth requirements and the logistics community will be forced to operate 
its automation outside the digital battle space.      
 15
4. Current Wireless Network Communications Capabilities 
 
Since the emergence of wireless network communications and computing in the mid-
1990s, a steady stream of new technologies and initiatives have helped to boost public 
awareness about its potential—and about various gadgets associated with the technology.  
Like cellular telephones did for voice communications, wireless data communications 
will yield powerful benefits to users.  To understand and evaluate the potential of 
wireless computing on a business enterprise, it is important to place the technology into 
perspective with respect to the business processes.  Assessment of alternative 
technologies and architectures should be done within this context to determine which 
proposed solutions are best suited to the business processes that are in use (and for those 
processes that may be affected by the technology, how they will be affected). 
 
Wireless connectivity offers the benefits of improved timeliness of information and 
increased ability to execute transactions that keep the business processes going without 
interruption.  Challenges that continue to be associated with wireless technologies include 
limits of coverage, reliability of equipment, speed of communication, cost of 
implementation, and defining and/or meeting established standards for the equipment and 
communication protocols.  Additional challenges concern the cost and resources/time 
required to enable legacy equipment/applications to support wireless communications.  
(For Army needs in particular, this applies to GCSS-A and STAMIS applications).  As 
the technology advances and legacy applications are phased out and replaced by more 
wireless-capable applications, these challenges will gradually be overcome and wireless 
communications will emerge as a strategic, enabling technology. 
 
Many types of wireless communications are in use today—and these architectures and 
devices are continually maturing.   The purpose of this section is to describe the current 
state of wireless network communications technology and infrastructure.  For the purpose 
of this report, wireless communications are listed as follows (see also Figure 4-1), and 
described more fully in subsequent subsections: 
 
• Wide Area Networks (WAN) include both terrestrial and satellite networks.  In the 
wireless world the more well-known cellular networks started with voice-to-voice 
communication, but with the introduction of Personal Communication Services (PCS) 
and other standard-based protocols, they are offering a wider range of services such 
as Email, two-way paging, and limited internet browsing capabilities for cellular 
phones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs).   
 
• Local Area Networks (LAN) include fixed wireless efforts that connect local wireless 
LAN sites.  This provides high-speed network connectivity for the mobile devices 
like PDAs and laptops. 
 
• Personal Area Networks (PAN) are wireless services based on locations within short 
proximity of the vendor or device.  Recently this area has gained momentum and 
support for standards such as Bluetooth [4]. 
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Type of 
Network 
Wireless 
Generation 
Connectivity/Protocol Theoretical 
Throughput 
Client 
Range 
WAN 1G GSM, AMPS 9.6 Kbps 5-8 Km 
WAN 2G CDPD, CDMA, 
TDMA 
19.2 Kbps 6-12 Km 
WAN 2.5G GPRS, 1XRTT 100-150 Kbps 6-12 Km 
WAN 3G CDMA 384 Kbps 6-12 Km 
LAN -- Wired LAN 10-100 Mbps 300 m 
LAN -- 802.11a 54 Mbps 100 m 
LAN -- 802.11b 11 Mbps 100 m 
PAN -- Bluetooth 1-2 Mbps 10 m 
Figure 4-1.  Network Types, Standards, and Speeds 
 
In Figure 4-1, the Wireless Generation is a function of speed and maturity of the 
technology.  Connectivity/Protocol refers to the type of technology employed.  
Theoretical Throughput is the best-case attainable speed over the network, which is 
typically 1.5 to 2 times faster than what is observed in actual practice. 
 
4.1 Wireless Wide Area Networks 
 
First generation (1G) systems are analog cellular communications systems designed for 
voice transfer.  The Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) is an example of 1G 
technology used in the US, operating in the 800 MHz range.  Other examples were 
derived from AMPS, such as Total Access Communications System, which operates in 
the UK. Another 1G system is the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), 
which operates in the 800 MHz range.  
 
In 1994 Sprint introduced what some say is the second generation of the cellular services 
PCS.  This allows two-way 1900MHz digital voice, messaging and data services.  Today 
cellular phones are rich with the features of this wireless service.  From that time forward 
the US wireless industry has evolved into a ubiquitous presence in the commercial world.  
Wireless WAN services are not just about the cellular phone but have made their mark in 
the PDA market. Variations of GSM that operate in the 1800 and 1900 Mz ranges are 
considered to be 2G technology. 1800 MHz GSM, referred to as PCN 1800, is used 
primarily in Europe. 1900 MHz GSM is referred to as PCS 1900 and is used in the urban 
areas of the United States. 
 
The newest models of cellular phone today are now capable of limited Internet browsing 
and e-commerce.   Seven of the top ten cellular phones sold in the US are either e-mail or 
web browser capable. All phones produced by Kyocera, Sanyo, and Samsung are e-mail 
and web browser capable. The most common protocol used by these vendors is CDMA.  
 
PDAs are now on the leading edge as these services expand their features.  The Palm VII 
was introduced along with its Mobile Internet Kit, which allows them to connect to 
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palm.net services.  Compaq has released their new iPAQ 3800 Series running Pocket PC 
2002 with Pocket Internet Explorer, which allows for 128-bit support and features to 
store cookies in a similar fashion to a PC. The iPAQs are also Bluetooth Integrated. Other 
devices like the Blackberry can synchronize appointments, To Dos, and calendar events.  
This model will also enable limited encryption of Email and other information. 
 
Today, second generation (2G) wireless computing is represented by Cellular Digital 
Packet Data (CDPD), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Time Division 
Multiple Access (TDMA) technologies.  CDPD is in common use in the United States for 
wireless data transfer over existing cellular networks.   CDMA is another 2G technology 
in use today in the United States; this standard allows for multiple transmissions to be 
carried simultaneously on a single wireless channel.  TDMA is similar to CDMA, and 
provides increased bandwidth over digital cellular networks.   
 
General Packet Radio System (GPRS) will provide packet switched data primarily for 
GSM based 2G networks. GPRS network elements consists of two main elements: SGSN 
(Service GPRS Support Node) and GGSN (Gateway GPRS Support Node). The GPRS is 
a new non-voice value added service that allows information to be sent and received 
across a mobile telephone network. It supplements today's Circuit Switched Data and 
Short Message Service. 
 
Wireless WAN devices today and in the future will present some challenging obstacles to 
overcome.  The lack of processing power limits some of the possibilities, such as 
advanced graphics for more enabled applications.  The lower powered central processing 
units (CPUs) also play a role in limiting security features required by Virtual Private 
Networking (VPN), with its higher levels of encryption and authentication.  These 
devices also have limited memory, commonly only several Megabytes, but up to 16 
Mbytes are used for application and data storage.  Small displays make Internet browsing 
challenging.  But perhaps the most important limitations concern the amount of 
bandwidth and the latency associated with the wireless WAN infrastructure. 
 
The 3G networks also use CDMA technologies, but in addition these must meet 
International Telecommunications Union specifications.  Commercial deployment of 3G 
is likely to be delayed in the United States because the Department of Defense is using 
the wireless frequency bands allocated for 3G.  There are also numerous competing 3G 
standards.  Thus there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the deployment of the 
higher quality 3G WANs.   
 
4.2 Wireless Local Area Networks 
 
A wireless LAN is a data transmission system designed to use radio waves to provide 
network connectivity between two or more devices without the use of a wired cable 
infrastructure.  There are several standards-based protocols used within this category, 
including HomeRF and 802.11b.  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) 802.11 standard was ratified in 1997 and specified a maximum data rate of 
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2Mbps.  Adoption of this new technology was slow, and the IEEE recognized the need 
for higher data rates so the IEEE ratified the 802.11b standard.  This allows for data rates 
up to 11Mbps at the unlicensed frequency of 2.4GHz.   With the ratifying of the 802.11b 
standard the acceptance of wireless communication has boomed into the commercial 
world and products are readily available with cost decreasing.  The HomeRF standard [5] 
also runs in the unlicensed frequency of 2.4GHz and data rates were recently allowed up 
to 10Mbps.  Products for HomeRF are just starting to be delivered; therefore, the 
acceptance of this standard is yet to be seen. Most of these products are operating at 1.6 
Mbps and are compliant with version 1.2.  The Proxim Symphony products are compliant 
with version 2.0 and support 10Mbps speeds. 
 
The 802.11b standard [6] defines two pieces of equipment: a wireless station, which 
usually consists of a PC with a wireless network interface card (NIC); and an access point 
that bridges communication from the wireless transmission media to a wired media.  
With these two types of equipment, the most common modes of operation are a wireless 
stations communicating with an access point, and two or more access points 
communicating directly. The wireless station / access point mode of operation is capable 
of 11Mbps at 150 meters in an open-air environment and approximately 40 meters in an 
office space environment with an omni-directional antenna.  This mode will support 
upwards of 254 wireless stations all sharing the same 11Mbps.   The direct access point 
to access point mode allows two or more wired networks to be bridged together with the 
wireless 802.11b technology.  These access points running in bridging mode can reach 
upwards of 25 miles in an open-air environment with a line of site directional antennas.  
The distance limitations are derived by the amount of power allowed and the focus of the 
signal.  An omni-directional antenna used when wireless stations are accessing it can only 
achieve relatively short distances, while a narrowly focused directional antenna in 
bridging mode can reach 25 miles.  The access point can run both as an access point and 
a bridge at the same time, allowing wireless stations to communicate with other wireless 
stations on an adjacent access point. 
  
The 802.11 standard defines the unlicensed frequency range for use of these devices at 
2.4GHz.   In the United States, this allows up to 11 channels; these devices use multiple 
channels to achieve the 11 Mbps maximum data rates.  Several wireless media are used to 
accomplish communication Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct 
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS).  Both of these wireless media shift their operating 
frequency to avoid interference and to make it harder to intercept the wireless signal.  In 
the 2.4GHz range, only three access points can occupy a common air space using the 11 
channels before they interfere with each other.  If there are more than three access points 
in a single location, they will have some interference and will therefore not operate at the 
maximum 11Mbps.    
 
4.3 Wireless Personal Area Networks 
 
Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) specifications are for wireless connectivity 
with fixed, portable and moving devices within or entering a Personal Operating Space 
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(POS). A goal of the WPAN Group will be to achieve a level of interoperability, which 
could allow the transfer of data between a WPAN device and an 802.11 device.  A POS 
is the space about a person or object that typically extends up to 10 meters in all 
directions and envelops the person whether stationary or in motion.  
 
One protocol that is being used in the WPAN is Bluetooth.  Designed as a short-distance 
networking protocol, Bluetooth connects disparate devices that traditionally have had 
wired connections, such as headset to telephone; digital still cameras; automotive 
accessories; medical devices; electronic payments at vending machines; and handheld 
computers and palmtop devices.  Bluetooth is a standard set by Bluetooth Special Interest 
Group (SIG) whose founding members are Intel, Nokia, Ericsson, Toshiba, and IBM.  
Since setting this standard in 1988, the membership has grown to 2000+ Bluetooth SIG 
members and 1300+ adopters of Bluetooth.  Bluetooth uses common unlicensed 
frequencies of the radio spectrum used by high-speed wireless local area networks and 
bar-code scanning devices. Currently, Bluetooth uses the 2.4GHz radio band, supports 
multipoint access, supports Personal Area Network (10-15 meters), and has data transfer 
speeds of 720 Kphs and 1 Mbps.   
 
The direction for wireless PAN is for low complexity, low power consumption wireless 
connectivity to support interoperability among devices within or entering the POS. This 
includes devices that are carried, worn, or located near the body.  Examples of devices, 
which can be networked, include Computers, PDAs or Handheld Personal Computers 
(HPCs), printers, microphones, speakers, headsets, bar code readers, sensors, displays, 
pagers, and cellular/ PCS phones.  Representative examples are shown in Figure 4-2. 
 
Wireless connectivity can be added easily to laptops using fairly standard technologies, 
typically PCMCIA (Peripheral Component Microchannel Interconnect Architecture) 
cards that are compatible with most machines.  With hand-held devices, proprietary 
hardware often limits the network choices and makes the connectivity problem more 
complex.  Cellular phones that support digital technology can support network 
connectivity; the wireless service provider for the phone provides the wireless Internet 
service. 
 
Device Representative Manufacturers 
Laptop PC Dell, Gateway, IBM, etc. 
Tablet PC Fujitsu, ViewSonic 
Palm OS handheld Palm, Handspring, Sony 
Pocket PC handheld HP, Compaq, Casio 
Handheld PC handheld HP, Casio, NEC, Sharp 
Email Pagers Motorola 
SMS-enabled phones* Ericsson, Motorola, Samsung, Nokia, etc. 
WAP-enabled phones** Ericsson, Motorola, Samsung, Nokia, etc. 
Palm OS smartphones Kyocera, Samsung, etc. 
*SMS = Short Messaging Service (typically, delivering 160-character text message to digital phone) 
**WAP = Wireless Application Protocol (provides optimized web access on digital wireless devices) 
Figure 4-2.  Mobile PAN Devices 
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4.4 Wireless Information Flow 
 
There are two basic wireless architecture models: real-time and synchronized.   
 
In the real-time access model, the mobile computing device can interact with information 
on the server only when a connection is available: the wireless device is connected to the 
network when the communication is desired; a query is sent to the server; the server 
locates the requested information and transmits it back to the device for viewing. 
 
In the synchronized access model, the user can interact with the information on the 
device at any time, regardless of connection availability; and then synchronize with the 
server when possible.  Synchronization middleware keeps information on the wireless 
device in sync with that on the server.  This is also referred to as “store & forward” 
technology. 
 
It is often assumed that wireless applications must always have real time access—a “thin 
client” model.  This is not the case.  In fact, synchronization, which has also been 
successfully applied to wired computing, is even more appropriate for many wireless 
applications.  Synchronization ensures that even when they are away from wireless 
coverage cells, users are able to get the information they need and continue to transact 
business. 
 
There are three basic connectivity models: wired, wireless WAN (ultimately 3G), and 
wireless LAN.  It should not be assumed that any one of these models is always preferred 
over another.  Indeed, a mixed model is almost always most appropriate and cost-
effective—in which all of the connectivity options are exercised depending upon 
availability. 
 
4.5 Security Implementation 
 
The need for security has been prominent in recent months.  Three types of security 
features are available in most commercial communication products today: 
 
• The Service Set Identifier (SSID) or often called the network name. 
• Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). 
• Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering. 
 
Most products require the SSID or network name be configured into all clients to make 
the association with an access point and function.  This is simply a name associated with 
particular access point and would likely be the same if the wireless station roams between 
access points.   
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WEP enables the encryption of the communication between devices.  WEP can be 
configured to use a 64-bit key or 128-bit key depending on the level of security desired.  
Recent discoveries have found vulnerabilities in the WEP protocol—for example, the 
initialization vector used as part of the encryption key is not a randomly generated 
number.  These and other vulnerability issues are discussed further in Appendix C. 
 
The third level of security is to filter MAC addresses of the wireless NIC.  This address is 
a unique identifier assigned to every wireless NIC card.  This form of security is secure 
but produces additional administrative overhead to update this filter list.   
 
In using all three levels of security a wireless station would have to know the SSID or 
network name, the 128bit key, and also use a specific wireless NIC card with its MAC 
address configured into the access point.   
 
Cisco, Microsoft, and other organizations have jointly initiated a promising security 
solution that uses a standards-based and open architecture approach to take full advantage 
of 802.11b security elements to provide the strongest level of security available and 
ensure effective security management from a central point of control. 
 
Central to the security solution are the following elements: 
• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), an extension to Remote Access Dial-In 
User Service (RADIUS) that can enable wireless client adapters to communicate 
with RADIUS servers  
• IEEE 802.1X, a proposed standard for controlled port access  
When the security solution is in place, a wireless client that associates with an access 
point cannot gain access to the network until the user performs a network logon. When 
the user enters a username and password into a network logon dialog box or its 
equivalent, the client and a RADIUS server (or other authentication server) performs a 
mutual authentication, with the client authenticated by the supplied username and 
password. The RADIUS server and client then derive a client-specific WEP key to be 
used by the client for the current logon session. All sensitive information, such as the 
password, is protected from passive monitoring and other methods of attack. Nothing is 
transmitted over the air in the clear. 
 
The sequence of events follows (see Figure 4-4): 
1. A wireless client associates with an access point.  
2. The access point blocks all attempts by the client to gain access to network resources 
until the client logs on to the network.  
3. The user on the client supplies a username and password in a network logon dialog 
box or its equivalent.  
4. Using 802.1X and EAP, the wireless client and a RADIUS server on the wired LAN 
perform a mutual authentication through the access point. One of several 
authentication methods or types can be used. With the Cisco authentication type, the 
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RADIUS server sends an authentication challenge to the client. The client uses a one-
way hash of the user-supplied password to fashion a response to the challenge and 
sends that response to the RADIUS server. Using information from its user database, 
the RADIUS server creates its own response and compares that to the response from 
the client. Once the RADIUS server authenticates the client, the process repeats in 
reverse, enabling the client to authenticate the RADIUS server.  
5. When mutual authentication is successfully completed, the RADIUS server and the 
client determine a WEP key that is distinct to the client and provides the client with 
the appropriate level of network access, thereby approximating the level of security 
inherent in a wired switched segment to the individual desktop. The client loads this 
key and prepares to use it for the logon session. The RADIUS server sends the WEP 
key, called a session key, over the wired LAN to the access point. The access point 
encrypts its broadcast key with the session key and sends the encrypted key to the 
client, which uses the session key to decrypt it.  
6. The client and access point activate WEP and use the session and broadcast WEP 
keys for all communications during the remainder of the session.  
 
 
Support for EAP and 802.1X delivers on the promise of WEP, providing a centrally 
managed, standards-based, and open approach that addresses the limitations of standard 
802.11 security. In addition, the EAP framework is extensible to wired networks, 
enabling an enterprise to use a single security architecture for every access method. 
It is likely that dozens of vendors will implement support for 802.1X and EAP in their 
wireless LAN products. Knowing the customer benefits of 802.1X, Cisco Systems 
supports the forthcoming standard today, offering a complete, end-to-end security 
solution that is fully compliant with 802.1X. The solution is available today when a site 
uses Cisco Aironet® wireless client adapters and access points and the Cisco Secure 
Access Control Server. 
 
The above description is one proprietary solution that addresses WEP security 
vulnerability.  Other proprietary solutions exist, such as the wireless link layer security 
architecture offered by Fortress Technologies (AirFortress) and a VPN tunneling solution 
architecture offered by NetScreen. 
Figure 4-3.  Centrally managed, standards-
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4.6 Issues 
 
Issues concerning use of wireless technology include security, commercial viability and 
competing standards, and support for multiple clients. 
 
Security. All computer systems and communications channels face security threats that 
can compromise systems, the services provided by the systems, and/or the data stored on 
or transmitted between systems. WEP is not immune to these threats and contains several 
inherent weaknesses.   
 
The foundation of WEP is a stream cipher algorithm. A stream cipher operates by 
expanding a short key into an infinite pseudo-random key stream. The sender performs an 
Exclusive Or (XOR) operation on the key stream with the plaintext to produce ciphertext. 
The receiver has a copy of the same key, and uses it to generate identical key stream. 
XORing the key stream with the ciphertext yields the original plaintext.  This mode of 
operation makes stream ciphers vulnerable to several attacks. If an attacker flips a bit in 
the ciphertext, then upon decryption, the corresponding bit in the plaintext will be 
flipped. Also, if an eavesdropper intercepts two ciphertexts encrypted with the same key 
stream, it is possible to obtain the XOR of the two plaintexts. Knowledge of this XOR 
can enable statistical attacks to recover the plaintexts. The statistical attacks become 
increasingly practical as more ciphertexts that use the same key stream are known. Once 
one of the plaintexts becomes known, it is trivial to recover all of the others. 
 
WEP was never intended to provide more protection than a physically protected LAN 
environment.  Since most LAN’s are physically protected from external access, WEP was 
designed for equivalency protection from casual eavesdropping. WEP was never intended 
to be a complete security solution. Like wired LANs, a wireless network needs to be 
augmented with additional security mechanisms (e.g., end-to-end encryptions, virtual 
private networks, etc.), as appropriate to the requirements of the user organization.  
 
Finally, the standard on which WEP is based is not as stringent as it needs to be. It will be 
sometime yet until the standard is modified, balloting is complete, and new protection 
mechanisms work their way into commercial products. However, the message is clear 
that the standard will change and new products will provide increased protection. 
 
For a more detailed review of these issues and possible safeguards, refer to Appendix C.   
 
Commercial viability and competing standards.  Wireless communication using the 
802.11b standard is gaining acceptance with the commercial market.  Products are 
becoming more user-friendly and the price to install and operate is decreasing.  Product 
compatibility is improving but it is recommended to stay with one vendor’s suite of 
solutions to guarantee 100% compatibility of features.  Improved data rates are expected 
with the ratification of the IEEE 802.11a standard.  This new standard specifies a 
frequency range at 5.4GHz, which allows for a maximum of 54Mbps throughput.  
Devices are expected to be shipping with this capability within the year. 
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Support for multiple clients.  The support for the 802.11b standard is developing 
rapidly.  Depending on the vendor, there is support for all Windows clients, Macintosh, 
Linux, Palm and other devices that have a PC Card Type II slot.   
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5. Summary of Requirements and Issues 
 
To summarize, the previous sections of this report reviewed the existing IBCT O&O plan 
with regard to identifying requirements and impediments to achieving optimal CSS 
information flow.   The study seeks to identify short-term solutions to fill existing gaps or 
to recommend modifications to O&O plan to overcome communications issues.  Any 
proposed short-term plans must provide for integration and transition into the operational 
architecture. 
5.1 Unique IBCT “Core” Requirements 
 
To date, the following unique requirements have been identified for the IBCT: 
1. Light force, small footprint requirement 
2. Low density of technical support due to elimination of CSSAMO organization for the 
IBCT 
3. Introduction of the concept of split basing and Interim Staging Bases (ISB) 
4. No existing unclassified date network support for the CRT forward. 
5. ULLS-G function required in the CRT forward 
6. Requirement for a communications path from the CRT to work in all terrain 
conditions 
7. Requirement for the CRT communications system to be integrated with other 
enablers.  
 
We will refer to these as core requirements in the sense that any solution must satisfy 
these requirements in order to be acceptable.  Additional factors that may be used to 
discriminate among possible alternative wireless communications architectures are 
discussed in Section 5.3. 
 
5.2 Issues Identified In the Draft Interim Report 
 
The Draft Interim Report [1] identified the following impediments or issues for the 
IBCT: 
• Doctrinally the Tactical Internet (TI) is classified as secret and all log STAMIS traffic 
has been identified as Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). This limits the transmission 
of log data to local area intranets and disk transfers.       
• There is no seamless process for moving information from unclassified systems to 
classified systems on the battlefield. 
• There are no unclassified communications pipes from the CRT to BSA. 
• Originally the capacity on the ULLS-G platform in the CRT did not support multiple 
line item input. {PNNL identified this problem and followed through in facilitating a 
solution: software changes have been made to eliminate the problem}. 
• The IBCT technical support staff has strong concerns about their ability to continue to 
support the growing unclassified network structure and computer devices that are 
being fielded. 
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During the past 12-18 months the IBCT has deliberated with TRADOC to define and 
resolve the issue of logistics connectivity and doctrine.  PNNL has continued to work 
with the IBCT to describe possible solutions and chart out courses for their 
implementation.  There has been only modest progress in overcoming these challenges.  
As a result of the recommendations in the PNNL Draft Interim Report [1] and continued 
follow-on efforts to assist the brigade by defining alternatives and assessing solutions, the 
following incremental improvements have been accomplished: 
 
• The IBCT successfully transmitted data utilizing the Advanced SINCGARS 
(ASIP) radio. This is a very slow and unreliable system that requires additional 
equipment, personnel, and non-standard cabling. 
• PNNL assisted in coordination and setup of the CAISI wireless system and its 
subsequent implementation as the means of transmitting daily log STAMIS data. 
• PNNL supported the IBCT in utilizing the Electronic Technical Manual Interface 
(ETM-I). ETM-I software automates the mechanic fault and requisitioning data 
and wirelessly transmits it to the STAMIS. ETM-I saves time and decreases 
clerical error.  
 
As a result of these accomplishments, the previous baseline logistics communications 
architecture that was described in the Draft Interim Report [1] has changed from one 
based on the legacy CAISI design (shown below in Figure 5-1) to one based on the new 
wireless CAISI.  This new baseline architecture is shown in Figure 5-2. 
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5.3 Remaining IBCT CSS Wireless Communications Issues  
 
The current baseline, depicted in Figure 5-2, provides an unclassified network 
infrastructure in support of logistics systems that utilizes the wireless CAISI and 
network-enabled STAMIS.  The CRT and its STAMIS systems will be located in the 
BSA.  The following issues are identified (those shown in italics have been added since 
the Draft Interim Report): 
 
Planning and Doctrine-Related Issues  
• Current doctrine does not support unclassified network infrastructure.  The Tactical 
Internet (TI) is classified as secret and all log STAMIS traffic has been identified as 
Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). This limits the transmission of log data to local 
area intranets and disk transfers.       
• The IBCT technical support staff has strong concerns about their ability to continue to 
support the growing unclassified network structure and computer devices that are 
being fielded. 
• TRADOC staff has been unwilling to change the systems architecture in support of 
log STAMIS initiatives. Initiatives have been denied for the present; and IBCT1 and 
IBCT2 have been directed to work within the current baseline.  System architecture 
changes are being considered to support IBCT-3 and IBCT-4. 
• Currently, the O&O plan does not support the ULLS-G or SAMS systems forward 
with the CRT.  If the CRT deploys forward, the STAMIS system will remain in the 
BSA. The CRT will provide updates to the ULLS-G system via free-text messages in 
FBCB2.  In addition to manual entry of the FBCB2 free-text message at the CRT, this 
requires manual re-keying of the FBCB2 message at the BSA to transfer it back to 
STAMIS.  
• There is a need for overall systems integration oversight as new wireless systems 
(such as ETM-I, DPMCS, MC4) emerge.  At some point there may be a risk that the 
current architecture will be unable to scale up appropriately to accommodate 
additional wireless devices. 
 
Figure 5-2 Current Baseline IBCT
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Technical Issues and Additional Performance Factors 
 
Technical Issues: 
• There is no seamless process for moving information from unclassified systems to 
classified systems on the battlefield. 
• There is not an unclassified network infrastructure to pass logistics data back from the 
CRT to the STAMIS systems located within the BSA 
• There is a need to define emerging requirements for hand held logistics devices—
possible fielding to support ETM-I, PMCS, MC4, and STAMIS (locations, number of 
devices, number of wireless clients required). 
 
Additional Performance Factors: 
• Bandwidth and transmission rates are significant factors in choosing among potential 
wireless communications options. 
• Transmission range limitations represent another significant factor to be considered 
in evaluating possible wireless communications options. 
 
The following section examines alternative options to overcome technical issues toward 
meeting the IBCT core requirements. 
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6. IBCT Logistics Communications Options 
 
As described in the previous section, there are a number of issues and impediments 
preventing the IBCT from meeting its logistics communications needs.  Principal among 
these are: The current unclassified network infrastructure in support of logistics systems 
is provided by wireless CAISI and network-enabled STAMIS systems (see Figure 5-2).  
Currently, the O&O plan does not support the ULLS-G or SAMS systems forward with 
the CRT.  There is no unclassified network infrastructure to pass logistics data back from 
the CRT to the STAMIS systems located within the BSA. 
 
The current logistics communications baseline supports the light force with a small 
footprint, requires a low density of technical support, and supports split basing and 
Interim Staging Bases.  However, communication gaps remain and sneaker net is 
required because of lack of seamless wireless connectivity.  The communication 
technologies that may be applied to provide solutions to the logistics communications 
issues and requirements are illustrated in Figure 6-1.  As can be seen from the figure, 
there are trade-offs between range and throughput for the various technology solutions.   
 
  
 
 
This section describes near term architectures that enable the IBCT to function with 
current assets and some recommended upgrades that will enable the IBCT Logistic 
Community to meet its communications needs. 
 
The following alternatives are considered: 
 
Option 1—SINCGARS (ASIP). Utilizes the Single Channel Ground and Airborne 
Radio System (SINCGARS) ASIP (Advanced SINCGARS Improvement Program) 
radios located in the brigade to transmit logistics data. This solution was tested and 
evaluated by the brigade at Yakima Training Center in April 2001. The ASIP data 
transfer was very slow and unreliable; and limited in distance and terrain.  It requires 
additional Windows OS computers, communication software, and a non-standard 
80211.a SATCOM
9.8Kbps28.8kpbs (1G) / 1.4 mbps (3G)
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100 m 6-12 Km
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Technology
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Throughput
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Figure 6-1.  Communication 
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interface cable. This is not recommended as a primary means of communication because 
of its cumbersome configuration and slow transfer speed.   
 
Option 2—Interim Wireless.  Interim solution involving Wireless Combat Service 
Support Automated Information System Interface (CAISI), Near Term Digital Radio 
(NTDR), and an In-Line Network Encryption (INE) device (TACLANE).  The 
combination of these systems would provide the logistician with near real time secure 
data processing without degrading the tactical command and control network. This would 
require reorganization of assets within the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) and 
would require the use of additional INEs. 
 
Option 3—Cellular Satellite Communication.  Utilize cellular satellite 
communications and replace the current legacy STAMIS communication software to 
enable connectivity with wireless technology.   Satellite communications eliminates 
sneaker nets from the BSA and the CRT. 
 
Option 4—3rd Generation Wireless Technology.  Future Fix/Objective or long-term 
solution involving an upgrade to CAISI Wireless system and Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) cellular technology.  Third generation wireless technology achieves a 
2.4 Mbs transmission rate, and CDMA cellular technology achieves a BSA range of 6-12 
Km. 
 
6.1 Option 1: SINCGARS (ASIP)  
A proposed immediate fix for the IBCT is to utilize the CAISI wireless system to provide 
an unclassified network infrastructure to support legacy STAMIS systems within the 
BSA.  To support the transmission of STAMIS information from the CRT, it is proposed 
that the IBCT CRT make use of the SINCGARS (ASIP) FM radio. The ASIP would 
transfer CRT STAMIS data over the current FM network.  
 
This solution provides a 1200 baud transmission rate and a CRT to BSA range of 19.5 
Km.  This architecture is depicted in Figure 6-2. 
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Advantages:  
• Eliminates the requirement for disk transfer (sneaker net) from the CRT to the BSA.  
• Supports light force, small footprint requirement 
• Supports limited split basing and Interim Staging Bases (limited frequencies available 
to SINCGARS limits the number of data nets to support interim staging bases) 
• Provides limited support of unclassified data transfer from the CRT forward (because 
of low data rates) 
• Provides limited support of ULLS-G function in the CRT forward (sneaker net still 
required in BSA and CRT) 
• Provides limited support of STAMIS communications path from CRT in all terrain 
conditions (severe terrains limit SINCGARS transmission distances and require 
increased number of relay stations). 
 
Disadvantages:  
• Data transfer is very slow, unreliable 
• Requires increased density of technical support  
• Sneaker net is still required within BSA and within CRT to accommodate data 
transfer between ASIP and STAMIS systems 
• CRT communications systems are not integrated with other enablers.  Feasibility of 
integrating with other enablers is low because of low data transmission rates and the 
difficulty of establishing a seamless connection between the enabler and WIN-PC.  
 
 
 
6.2 Option 2: Interim Wireless 
This interim solution, illustrated in Figure 6-3, involves the wireless CAISI, NTDR, and 
an INE device (TACLANE or NES).  The combination of these systems provides the 
logistician with near real time secure data processing without degrading the tactical 
command and control network. This requires some reorganization of assets within the 
Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) and some additional INEs. It is currently being 
considered for incorporation into the systems architecture for IBCT-3 and IBCT-4.  
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This solution provides a transmission rate of 11 mbps and a CRT to BSA range of 5-8 
Km, constrained by line-of-sight/terrain limitations. 
 
Advantages:  
• Supports light force, small footprint requirement 
• Requires a lower density of technical support 
• Supports split basing and Interim Staging Bases by allowing the STAMIS system to 
work in dispersed locations 
• Supports unclassified data network for the CRT forward by tunneling unclassified 
data via the INE device through the classified tactical network 
• Supports ULLS-G function in the CRT forward by providing a communication path 
to its support assets (SARSS and SAMS) 
• Supports CRT communications path in the same terrain conditions that the Tactical 
Internet is able to support 
• Integrates CRT communications system with other enablers 
• Processes data at near real time; updates command /control systems more frequently 
• Eliminates the risk of lost data, people, and equipment 
 
Disadvantages:  
• Utilizes command and control communication pipeline 
• Requires more equipment (INE). 
 
6.3 Option 3: Cellular Satellite Communication 
 
Several new communications initiatives use 2nd and 3rd generation wireless 
communications technology.  This technology provides for both voice and data 
throughput support speeds of up to 2.4 mbps.  To fully support these systems, an 
upgraded ULLS-G type of application is needed to overcome lower bandwidth access 
speeds. This problem should be fixed with future ULLS-G changes that will provide the 
option to convert the ULLS software to Windows 2000.     
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Satellite communications (SATCOM) address the communications requirements for the 
diverse locations of the CRT in all kinds of terrains.  Current SATCOM voice/data 
handset supports a data throughput in the range of 14.4 kbs.      
 
Option 3 (Figure 6-4) uses SATCOM phones to transmit ULLS-G type information from 
the CRT via satellite to the BSA.  This eliminates the sneaker net between the CRT and 
the BSA, eliminates the SINCGARS ASIP device, and provides terrain independent 
communications for the CRT.  However, for the unclassified, higher density BSA 
communications, SATCOM is an expensive alternative.   
 
This option provides a transmission rate of 9.8 kbps uplink, 14.4 kbps downlink.  The 
CRT to BSA range is unlimited in ideal circumstances, but practically limited by 
geographic constraints and availability of cellular access. 
 
Advantages:  
• Eliminates disk transfer from forward deployed CRT 
• Supports light force, small footprint requirement 
• Supports split basing and Interim Staging Bases by allowing the STAMIS system to 
work in dispersed locations 
• Supports unclassified data network from the CRT to BSA with its own dedicated 
communication path 
• Supports ULLS-G function in the CRT forward by providing a communication path 
to its support assets (SARSS and SAMS) 
• Provides CRT communications path in all terrain conditions. Satellite 
communications not normally hindered by terrain features 
• Processes data at near real time and updates command and control systems more 
frequently 
• Eliminates the risk of lost data, people, and equipment 
 
Disadvantages:  
• Requires ULLS-G upgrade 
• Cellular satellite communications have not been fully integrated with existing CRT 
logistics systems enablers.  Feasibility of integration with other enablers is high 
because of the ability of satellite communications systems to support standard 
network protocols. (A feasibility demonstration is planned for December 2001). 
• SATCOM is expensive 
• There is not currently a single satellite communications system with worldwide 
coverage. 
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6.4 Option 4: 3rd Generation Wireless Technology 
Option 4 incorporates the 3rd-generation cellular communications systems that would 
utilize the same SATCOM data/voice handset used in option 3, but also includes an 
upgrade to existing LAN wireless technology from CAISI wireless to CDMA cellular.  
This achieves a 6-12 km BSA range.  Option 4 is represented in Figure 6-5. 
 
Notionally, a CRT operating outside the BSA 6-12 km range would use a satellite link to 
transmit log information back to the BSA.  When operating within the 6-12 km range, the 
CRT SATCOM voice/data handset would automatically transmit the log information via 
the cellular network instead.  Within the BSA, the cellular network would support 
unclassified network access at up to 2.4 mbs. 
 
 
Advantages:  
• Eliminates disk transfer from forward deployed CRT 
• Supports light force, small footprint requirement 
• Supports split basing and Interim Staging Bases by allowing the STAMIS system to 
work in dispersed locations 
• Supports unclassified data network for the CRT forward by tunneling unclassified 
data via the INE device through the classified tactical network 
• Supports ULLS-G function in the CRT forward by providing a communication path 
to its support assets (SARSS and SAMS) 
• Supports CRT communications path in the same terrain conditions that the Tactical 
Internet is able to support 
• Processes data at near real time; updates command/control systems more frequently 
• Eliminates the risk of lost data, people, and equipment. 
 
Disadvantages:  
• Requires ULLS-G upgrade 
• Cellular satellite communications have not been fully integrated with existing CRT 
logistics systems enablers.  Feasibility of integration with other enablers is high 
because of the ability of satellite communications systems to support standard 
network protocols. 
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• SATCOM is expensive 
• Currently there is no single satellite communications system with world-wide 
coverage. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
The results of the Tradeoff Analysis are summarized in Table 7-1.  The ability of the 
various architectures to satisfy the core requirements is summarized in the top part of the 
table.  Options that do not satisfy one or more of these core requirements represent 
unacceptable solutions.  Options that satisfy all of the core requirements should be further 
evaluated according to their capability in achieving the additional performance factors, 
shown in the lower portion of the table. 
 
 
Table 7-1.  IBCT Requirements Supported by CSS Communications Options  
 
 Options  
Core Requirements Current 
Baseline 
(1) 
SINCGARS 
(2) Interim 
Wireless 
(3) Cellular 
SATCOM 
(4) 3G 
Wireless 
1. Supports light force with 
small footprint? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2. Requires low density of 
technical support 
(CSSAMO eliminated)? 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
3. Supports split basing 
and Interim Staging 
Bases (ISB)? 
Yes 
(Limited) 
Yes 
(Limited) 
Yes Yes Yes 
4. Supports unclassified 
data network for the CRT 
forward? 
No Yes 
(Limited) 
Yes Yes Yes 
5. Supports ULLS-G 
function in the CRT 
forward? 
Yes 
Limited 
Yes 
Limited 
Yes Yes Yes 
6. Provides a STAMIS 
communications path 
from the CRT to work in 
all terrain conditions? 
No Yes 
(Limited) 
Yes Yes Yes 
7. Feasibility of integrating 
CRT communications 
system with other 
enablers. 
Low Low High  
(already 
integrated)
High High 
 
Additional Factors Current 
Baseline 
(1) 
SINCGARS 
(2) Interim 
Wireless 
(3) Cellular 
SATCOM 
(4) 3G 
Wireless 
Bandwidth/Transmission 
Rate 
Sneaker 
Net 
1200 
baud 
11 mbps 9.8/14.4 
kbps 
2.4 mbps 
CRT to BSA Range/Limits Sneaker 
Net 
19.5 Km 5-8 Km 
Line of Sight
Unlimited* Unlimited 
 
 
As is evident from Table 7-1, the Interim Wireless solution, the Cellular SATCOM 
solution, and the 3G Wireless solution (Options 2, 3, and 4, respectively) each satisfy all 
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of the core requirements; but they may be discriminated according to the additional 
performance factors.   
 
PNNL continues to support the IBCT in developing optimized configurations to 
implement immediate fixes to the baseline architecture using existing assets of the IBCT.  
Thus, the current baseline, shown in the second column, already represents an 
improvement over the situation as described in our draft Interim Report [1].  Option 1 
(SINCGARS; third column in the above table) represents a substantial improvement over 
the current baseline, but still requires sneaker net and still suffers from terrain limitations.  
The Interim Wireless solution (Option 2; fourth column in the above table) represents the 
first step along the path toward the objective solution in which all of the requirements are 
met.   This architecture provides near real time secure data processing without degrading 
the tactical command and control network, but it will require some reorganization of 
assets within the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) and some additional INEs.  This 
option also has some distance limitations (CAISI wireless communication limited to 6.5 
km within the BSA).  This solution is being considered for incorporation into the systems 
architecture for IBCT-3 and IBCT-4.  Option 3 (Cellular Satellite Communications) 
eliminates the terrain and range limitations of Option 2.  However, for the unclassified, 
higher density BSA communications, SATCOM is an expensive alternative.  Option 4 
incorporates the 3rd-generation cellular communications systems that would utilize the 
same SATCOM data/voice handset used in Option 3, but also includes an upgrade to 
existing LAN wireless technology from CAISI wireless to CDMA cellular.  This 
achieves a 6-12 km BSA range.   
 
Options 3 and 4 are clearly preferred and should be considered for IBCT-3 and IBCT-4.  
Currently, several tests have been conducted using QualComm’s deployable PCS system.  
Other tests are scheduled in the near future to test the viability of using their deployable 
PCS system to transmit logistics data. Use of 3G cellular communications systems is also 
being evaluated as part of the WIN-T architecture.   
 
As mentioned earlier in this report (the end of section 4.4), best practices would suggest 
that all communications connectivity models (wired, wireless WAN/ultimately 3G, and 
wireless LAN) should be employed in a mixed-mode architecture.  All of the connectivity 
options may be exercised depending upon availability.  This vision for logistics 
communications is illustrated in Figure 7-1 (vision of mixed-mode, flexible architecture) 
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and Figure 7-2 (vision of logistics information flow).  Thus, in-garrison communications 
can be supported via wired LAN when operators have access to networked systems and 
wireless WAN modes may be used for operations within 300-400 feet of 80211.b 
equipment.  CAISI wireless equipment and handheld devices may be used to download 
detailed maintenance information from crew/mechanic computers (or PDAs) as well as 
the “rich data stream” available from onboard embedded diagnostic/prognostic systems.  
For operations in the field, 80211.b wireless systems such as CAISI and PDAs (e.g., 
DPMCS) may be used to acquire logistics/health status data from onboard computers – 
e.g., during preventive maintenance checks and services or fuel resupply.  When 
operations extend to the 5-11 km range, 3G cellular communications may be used to 
transmit maintenance reports and high-level platform health status (e.g., LOGSITREP).  
Conceivably, 3G cellular technology has sufficient bandwidth to allow even the “rich 
data stream” to be captured this way, directly from onboard embedded 
diagnostics/prognostics systems.  For operations that are beyond the range of cellular 
communications, satellite communications offer the ultimate solution.  Because 
bandwidth constraints may limit the amount of logistics data that can be transmitted via 
satellite, it is possible that this type of communication will be limited to high level 
LOGSITREP data.  Downloading of the rich data stream, more useful for maintenance 
scheduling and life cycle analyses, would be done routinely at opportune times during 
inspections, resupply, refueling, etc.  In any case, high-level (LOGSITREP) data should 
always be available in near real time via the tactical logistics communications supported 
by FBCB2.   
 
Ideally, the determination of which communications modes to use at any time would be 
accomplished automatically, transparent to the users.  This will require “smart” 
communication devices that will support 802.11b, 3G cellular, and SATCOM modes, and 
that will have the capability to switch autonomously among them based on such factors 
as signal strength, availability, etc 
 
   
Finally, it is noted that these conclusions are considered to have an “interim” status due to 
the evolving nature of the IBCT O&O and the ongoing integration of various enabling 
technologies.  The final results of this study must await validation with other 
stakeholders, assessment of integration potential with the WIN-T architecture, possible 
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compatibility with the GCSS-A, and assessment of additional advanced technology 
demonstrations.    
 
 
Figure 7-2. Information flow in “smart”
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8. Recommendations 
 
The following areas for further study represent a summary of our current 
recommendations, based upon the preceding analysis: 
 
• Investigate alternatives to ULLS-G that support low-bandwidth communication 
• Integrate the various enablers to use a common communication backbone (e.g., ETM-
I to use CAISI wireless) 
• Optimize location of STAMIS systems within the CRT and BSA 
• Continue to examine STAMIS connectivity issues.  Current direction is to use FTP 
(File Transfer Protocol) to support connectivity with CAISI wireless, rather than the 
previous method using the Legacy Support Adapter and Blast protocol.  There are 
currently two alternative solutions for implementing the FTP link with CAISI 
(offered by Ft. Hood and Ft. Stewart) 
• Determine the most effective interface between classified and unclassified networks 
for the transfer of logistics information between CSSCS systems and log STAMIS 
systems 
• Continue to explore mid-term communications architecture solutions to encompass 
the full suite of future logistics communications devices, tools and technologies 
(specifically, Qualcomm’s wireless DPMCS, the wireless ETM-I implementation, the 
new wireless CAISI, and Qualcomm’s deployable PCS).   
• Examine active synchronization performance of wireless handheld devices (PDAs) 
with laptop computers, as envisioned for mid-term and future transfer of CSS data 
from platforms to platoon leaders in the field 
• Continue coordination with CECOM, CASCOM, TRADOC, the LIA, and the IBCT 
to ensure effective transition of enablers and new technologies for CSS 
communications 
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APPENDIX A: Acronym List 
 
 
ABCS Army Battle Command Systems  
ALOC Administrative Logistics Operations Center 
AMPS Advanced Mobile Phone Service 
ASIP Advanced SINCGARS Improvement Program 
ASLP Army Strategic Logistics Plan 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network 
BAS  Battalion Aid Station 
BCT Brigade Combat Team 
BDAR Battle Damage Assessment and Repair 
BFA Battlefield Functional Areas 
BSA Brigade Support Area 
BSB Brigade Support Battalion 
BSMC Brigade Support Medical Company   
C2 Command and Control  
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
CAISI Combat Service Support Automated Information System Interface 
CAN  Airborne Communications Node 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access 
CDPD Cellular digital Packet Data 
CECOM US Army Communications-Electronics Command 
CHS Combat Health Support 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CRT Combat Repair Team 
CSS  Combat Service Support  
CSSCS  Combat Service Support Control System 
CTCP Combat Trains Command Post 
CTIL-BRIL Command tracked item list update message 
D Digital 
DBLS Distribution-Based Logistics System 
DCSLOG  Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics 
DNS  Domain Name Server 
DSSS  Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol  
EBC  Embedded battle command 
EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting Systems  
FAADC2I Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below  
FHSS  Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum 
FMC Forward Maintenance Company 
GCSS-A Global Combat Support System–Army 
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GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications 
HDC Headquarters and Distribution Company  
HPCs  Handheld Personal Computers 
IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IER  Information Exchange Requirement 
INE In-Line Network Encryption 
ISB  Interim Staging Bases  
LAN Local Area Network 
LIA Logistics Integration Agency 
LOGC2 ACTD Logistics Command and Control Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration 
LOGSITREP Logistics situational reports 
MAC Media Access Control 
MC4 Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care 
METT-TC  Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, Civilians  
MSE Mobile Subscriber Equipment 
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment  
MTS Maneuver Tracking System 
NES  Network Encryption System 
NIC  network interface card 
NTDR Near Term Digital Radio 
PAN  Personal Area Networks 
PCS  Personal Communication Services 
PCMCIA Peripheral Component Microchannel Interconnect Architecture  
PDAs  Personal Digital Assistants 
PERSITREP Personnel situation report 
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
POS  Personal Operating Space 
RADIUS Remote Access Dial-In User Service 
RETRANS Re-Transmission 
RML Revolution in Military Logistics 
RS-232 Recommended Standard 232 (IEEE computer serial interface) 
RSTA Reconnaissance Surveillance Target Acquisition 
SA Situational Awareness 
SAMS Standard Army Maintenance System  
SARSS Standard Army Retail Supply System 
SATCOM  Satellite communications 
SGSN Service GPRS Support Node 
SIDPERS Standard Installation/Division Personnel System 
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 
SMART-T Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal  
SSID  Service Set Identifier  
STAMIS  Standard Army Management Information Systems 
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TACSAT Tactical Communications Satellite 
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access 
TI Tactical Internet  
TOC  Tactical Operations Center 
TPN Tactical packet node 
TUAV Tactical Unmanned Airborne Vehicle 
ULLS Unit Level Logistics System 
ULLS-G Unit Level Logistics System-Ground 
V Voice 
VPN  Virtual Private Networking 
WAN  Wide Area Networks  
WEP  Wired Equivalent Privacy 
WIN Warfighter Information Network 
WIN-T  Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
WPAN  Wireless Personal Area Network 
WSSPR Weapon Systems Support Platform-based Readiness 
XOR Exclusive Or 
1G First generation 
2G Second generation 
3G Third generation 
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APPENDIX B: Standard Network Configuration for STAMIS  
 
Problem 
 
Legacy STAMIS file transfer options have restricted the ability of the IBCT to operate on 
the modern digital battlefield. The majority of the operating systems and hardware 
configurations do not have the ability to use the newer networking technologies present 
in the IBCT. The Army does not plan to upgrade the current STAMIS configuration until 
the deployment of Global Combat Support System–Army (GCSS-A). This makes 
operating within the current IBCT systems architecture almost impossible.  
 
In our experience with the IBCT, the support personnel are able to set up current wireless 
communication technology (e.g., 802.11b) and get the network to communicate 
effectively, but there have been serious challenges in getting STAMIS to operate within 
this architecture.  The source of the problem is that it is difficult and time consuming to 
configure legacy STAMIS equipment to support standard network interface cards. 
 
 
Background 
 
Current communication configuration:  In order to establish communications, most units 
use a Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) most commonly called “blast.”  Blast PPP establishes 
the communication link by passing a set of packets to configure and test the data link. 
Once established, Blast sends a set of packets that must be processed in sequence to be 
authenticated.  Drawbacks of this method are: 
− Blast requires that the communication link be continuously operational and dedicated 
to the specific transmission.   
− Any interruption in the communication link requires a complete retransmission of the 
file. 
− The Blast configuration requires an additional device (Legacy Support Adapter/LSA) 
to convert serial communications from STAMIS to a network IP interface.  
 
FTP Interim Solution: Recently the IBCT acquired hardware and software from PEO 
STAMIS that utilizes standard File Transfers Protocols (FTP) to connect to CAISI 
wireless.  FTP will allow the STAMIS systems to operate within a standard network and 
extend the communication capabilities into the Tactical Internet.  The FTP solution will 
provide the following advantages: 
− FTP is a more robust communications protocol with inherent error-checking 
capability 
− FTP does not tie up the network interface (allows multiple simultaneous transactions 
over the same connection) 
− FTP is supported by more modern, wireless communications systems 
− FTP eliminates the requirement for a LSA device; it uses a standard network 
(Ethernet) card in the STAMIS equipment. 
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At present, there are multiple proposed procedures for configuring the FTP solution for 
STAMIS applications (e.g., procedures for implementing the FTP link are available from 
Fort Lee and from Ft. Stewart).  While these procedures yield the same result, they are 
not standardized within or between STAMIS applications.  Further, there are no plans  
to implement the FTP process into any legacy Software Change Packages (SCP).  
Lacking organizational support, the burden of making necessary STAMIS configuration 
changes reverts to operational units with limited resources.  Therefore, we have observed 
(at the IBCT) piecemeal conversion to a STAMIS standard network configuration.  
Because of the inconsistencies and potential for errors and incompatibilities, operators 
tend to revert to traditional manual modes of information transfer (sneaker net).   
 
There is a need to standardize the various proposed procedures for converting standalone 
STAMIS systems to be network capable and to support FTP. 
 
Objective 
 
The objective is to further define and assess the efficacy of the FTP interim solution in 
meeting IBCT communication requirements.  The goal is to develop a single, 
standardized procedure for configuring all STAMIS equipment (SAMS, ULLS, etc.) that 
will be supported and promoted by the Army (in SCPs). 
 
Recommended Approach 
 
The following tasks are required to achieve this objective: 
 
1. Collect/survey procedures that are in use for configuring STAMIS to support FTP. 
2. Consolidate procedures based on best practices. 
3. Develop a single, authoritative document that standardizes the procedure across all 
STAMIS applications. 
4. Provide necessary supporting documentation for operators in the field. 
 
Work with IBCT in facilitating the adoption of the proposed standard (it should be 
implemented using the SCP process). 
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APPENDIX C: Wireless Communications Vulnerabilities 
 
Introduction 
 
Local Area Network (LAN) standards are developed by the IEEE 802 LAN/MAN 
Standards Committee, which develops Local Area Network standards and Metropolitan 
Area Network standards. The most widely used standards are for the Ethernet family: 
Token Ring, Wireless LAN, Bridging and Virtual Bridged LANs. An individual Working 
Group provides the focus for each area. 
 
The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies the requirements for implementing wireless Local 
Area Network. There are three prevailing IEEE 802.11 specifications. IEEE 802.11 was 
ratified in 1997 and supports a data rate of 2 Mbits/second. IEEE 802.11b specifies rates 
up to 11 Mbits/second and was ratified in 1999. IEEE 802.11a operates at data rates up to 
54 Mbits/second and is the emerging high-speed option. Part of the specification is the 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol that is designed to protect the link layer traffic 
from eavesdropping and other attacks. 
 
Security Threats 
 
All computer systems and communications channels face security threats that can 
compromise systems, the services provided by the systems, and/or the data stored on or 
transmitted between systems. The most common threats are: 
 
• Denial of service 
• Interception  
• Manipulation 
• Masquerading 
• Repudiation 
 
Denial of service occurs when an adversary causes a system or a network to become 
unavailable to legitimate users or causes services to be interrupted or delayed. 
Overloading the target system often causes denial of service. Consequences can range 
from a measurable reduction in performance to the complete failure of the system. A 
wireless example would be using an external signal to jam the wireless channel. There is 
little that can be done to keep a serious adversary from mounting a denial of service 
attack. 
 
Interception has more than one meaning. A user’s identity can be intercepted leading to 
a later instance of masquerading. A data stream can be intercepted by an adversary for the 
purpose of disclosing otherwise private information. In either case, the adversary is 
attacking the confidentiality or privacy of the information that is intercepted. An example 
would be eavesdropping and capturing the wireless interchanges between a user device 
and the network access point. Since wireless systems use the radio band for transmission, 
a diligent adversary can intercept all transmissions. Therefore, some form of strong 
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authentication and encryption is necessary in order to keep the contents of intercepted 
signals from being disclosed.  
 
Manipulation means that data have been inserted, deleted, or otherwise modified on a 
system or during transmission. This is an attack on the integrity of either the data 
transmission or on the data stored on a system. An example would be the insertion of a 
Trojan program or virus on a user device or into the network. Protection of access to the 
network is the most effective means of avoiding manipulation.  
 
Masquerading refers to the act of an adversary posing as a legitimate user in order to 
gain access to a wireless network or a system served by the network. For example, a user 
with illegitimate access to a network authenticator could access the network. Strong 
authentication is required to avoid masquerade attacks. 
 
Repudiation is when a user denies having performed an action on the network. Users 
might deny having sent a particular message or deny accessing the network and 
performing some action. Strong authentication of the user and integrity measures can 
minimize the possibility of repudiation. 
 
Security Services and Vulnerabilities 
 
The security function specified in IEEE 802.11 is Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). 
WEP provides two basic levels of security. Open System Authentication (OSA) is part of 
the standard, but provides little security. The second is shared-key authentication that 
provides the highest level of security available in WEP. Neglecting the OSA, the shared 
key model specifies a number of requirements intended to defeat or mitigate some of the 
threats mentioned earlier. Particular attention was paid to 1) authenticating users over an 
encrypted channel, 2) defeating an adversary’s ability to eavesdrop on wireless 
transmissions in order to preserve confidentiality by encrypting the channel traffic, and 3) 
providing integrity assurance that a message was not modified in transit.  
 
Open System Authentication. Open System Authentication (OSA) is an authentication 
method that depends on establishing a security association between any device 
attempting communication with the network and a network access point. The method 
blocks any access that is not associated with a valid Media Access Control (MAC) 
address. The MAC address is the unique 48-bit value identified on the MAC interface 
contained in each wireless interface card installed in a wireless user device. The access 
point maintains a list of valid addresses entered by the system administrator at the time a 
user is granted access to the network. If the MAC address offered is present in the access 
point list, access is granted; otherwise access is denied. This method has the following 
problems and vulnerabilities: 
 
1. Maintaining a list of valid MAC addresses is a labor-intensive activity and adds 
significant cost to the administration of the network. 
2. An individual with technical knowledge can spoof MAC addresses. While this 
might be discovered if two systems with the same MAC address attempt to 
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access the network, careful planning on the part of an adversary can often avoid 
using the network at the same time as the legitimate user.  
 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP).  The foundation of WEP is based on the use of a 
stream cipher, RC4 encryption. The RC4 algorithm has three inputs, an initializing vector 
IV, the random key, and the plaintext. The IV is input to E, the RC4 encryption 
algorithm, along with the key. The algorithm generates a keystream output from E that is 
sent to the output box O. The output box O shifts the keystream out, a byte at a time and 
each byte is combined with the plaintext P under the Exclusive OR function. The output 
of E is also fed back to the I stage which causes the keystream to vary as encryption 
proceeds. 
 
Since IV must be known to the transmitter and receiver, it is sent to the receiver as an 
unencrypted part of the ciphertext stream. A straightforward logic function inserts IV into 
the ciphertext stream and recovers it from the stream for input to the I function at the 
receiving end.  IV does not have to be secret since RC4’s strength is derived from the 
algorithm and key, not IV. However, the integrity of IV needs to be assured or decryption 
will not function properly. 
 
The RC4 algorithm supports variable length keys. The two lengths most commonly used 
for wireless applications are 40 bits for export controlled systems and 128 bits for 
domestic application. Although most vendors advertise 128 encryption, the actual key 
length is 104 bits. 
 
Key Management.  The standard does not specify how keys are managed or distributed. 
It does provide for an externally populated globally shared array of 4 keys. In addition, it 
allows for an additional array that associates a unique key with each user station. Most 
existing implementations utilize a shared secret key to encrypt the link transmission 
between all users and the wireless network access point. All users and the access point 
know the key. Some access points allow for two channels such that the keys for each 
channel can be different. Devices assigned to one channel still share the secret key with 
other users assigned to that channel and the access point. 
 
Integrity Assurance.  The plaintext input pj string is composed of the original message M 
with a CRC32 checksum of the message appended to the end of the message. The 
purpose of the checksum is to provide the integrity service.  At the receiver the ciphertext 
is decrypted, the CRC32 bit string is calculated on the original plaintext input string and 
compared to the CRC32 received. If the CRCs match then the original message is 
accepted as valid. 
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Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses   
 
RC4 was developed in 1987 by Ron Rivest of MIT for RSA Data Security, Inc. Initially 
the algorithm was protected by RSA as a trade secret and not publicly disclosed. 
However, in 1994, the algorithm was anonymously posted to the Cypherpunk mailing list 
and it quickly spread to news and ftp sites around the world. Subsequent analysis 
indicates that RC4 is immune to linear and differential cryptanalysis, is very non-linear, 
and does not have short cycles. It is used in many commercial products. 
 
Unfortunately, WEP is not a secure implementation of RC4 and violates several other 
cryptographic design and implementation principles, including issues of Interception, 
Keystream Reuse, and Integrity Assurance. 
 
Interception. Many of the attacks depend on the ability of an adversary to intercept 
wireless traffic. Fundamentally, we know that any traffic transmitted by radio signal is 
subject to interception since it is a radio frequency broadcast. The IEEE 802.11 standard 
specifies three possible physical layers, Infrared (IR), Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum (FHSS), and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and broadcasts in three 
frequency bands, 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz, and 5 GHz. Products in the field typically use 
DSSS and the 2.4 GHz band. Any device designed for service in the appropriate band of 
frequencies is readily capable of receiving all signals. It is a relatively easy matter to 
modify device drivers and/or flash memory to promiscuously monitor traffic. 
Consequently, it should be assumed that an adversary has access to intercepted signals. 
      
Keystream Reuse.  One of the well known attributes of stream ciphers operating in output 
feedback mode is that encrypting two messages under the same IV and key can reveal 
information about both messages to a cryptanalyst.  In order to execute this attack the 
adversary would have to capture packets and compare IV values searching for collisions. 
A collision would allow analysis of a single packet. If the plaintext of one packet is 
known and is carefully selected, then the plaintext of the other packet would be revealed. 
 
It is a relatively simple matter to get a known plaintext injected into the network by 
addressing a message to a mobile user. Monitoring transmissions is somewhat more 
difficult, but can be done with moderate effort. Once the key is revealed all transmissions 
using that key and IV are compromise.  The process is simplified to a great extent if the 
IV is not changed every packet. The standard recommends, but does not require, the IV to 
be changed every packet.  
 
Integrity Assurance.  The standard specifies an integrity algorithm that operates on the 
original plaintext message to produce an Integrity Check Value (ICV). The original 
plaintext is concatenated with the IVC to form the plaintext to be encrypted. The IVC 
method specified in the standard is CRC-32. The IVC is a 32-bit field called the FCS 
field and is defined as the last 4 octets in the MAC frame. Since the CRC-32 function is a 
linear function that uses only addition and multiplication, it is possible to change one, or 
more, bits in the original plaintext and be able to predict the bits to change in the CRC-32 
checksum such that the checksum remains valid when it is received. Integrity methods 
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that are cryptographically secure such as hash algorithms are non-linear functions that are 
not readily attacked. What this means is that it is possible to modify messages in transit 
without detection. This is probably not a concern as to the original message presented by 
the application for transmission. However, the checksum is performed over the entire 
MAC packet that includes higher-level protocol routing and port fields.  If an adversary 
turns their attention to modification of the IP destination field, it is possible to re-direct 
traffic to an unintended destination under the control of the adversary.   
 
Current Situation 
 
Existing Products.  In order to field a compatible implementation of the standard, 
vendors must implement all mandatory features of the standard. In some cases, like the 
use of CRC-32 for integrity, the standard is weak by design and needs to be changed. 
Until that happens, products will continue to be taken to market with known weaknesses.  
In other cases, stronger security measures are possible without violating the standard. 
Key management, for example, is a function that is external to the standard and can be 
implemented as a product developer sees fit. This creates the issue of interoperability 
limiting the selection of products for the organization that desires stronger protection, but 
most vendors do offer options that strengthen security. 
 
IEEE Activities.  There continues to be on-going development of the standard and a part 
of that development is stronger security measures. The chairman of the IEEE 802 
committee has publicly responded to the threat and vulnerabilities raised by the U. C. 
Berkeley team. Some of his more important comments are paraphrased as follows: 
 
1. WEP was never intended to provide more protection than a physically protected 
LAN environment. Since most LAN’s are physically protected from external 
access, WEP was designed for equivalency protection from casual eavesdropping. 
WEP was never intended to be a complete security solution. Like wired LANs, a 
wireless network needs to be augmented with additional security mechanisms 
(e.g., end-to-end encryptions, virtual private networks, etc.), as appropriate to the 
requirements of the user organization. 
2. The active attacks are not easy to mount. They are conceivable given enough time 
and resources, but may not yield enough value to an adversary to be worthwhile. 
3. Since July 1999, task Group E of the standards committee has been working on 
extensions to the standard with the specific goal of strengthening the security of 
the standard. The enhancements currently being considered are intended to 
counter extremely sophisticated attacks, including those that have been recently 
reported in the press.   
 
It will be sometime yet until the standard is modified, balloting is complete, and new 
protection mechanisms work their way into commercial products. However, the message 
is clear that the standard will change and new products will provide increased protection. 
 
The U. C. Berkeley Paper.  The Berkeley paper reveals that some attacks can be mounted 
with only a moderate effort while others are difficult and available only to a sophisticated 
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attacker with significant time and resources. In essence, the paper reports two significant 
weaknesses in wireless security: 
 
1. The use of a shared key coupled with the use of a relatively short 24-bit 
Initialization Vector (IV) makes it possible with moderate effort to recover keys 
and decrypt encrypted communications. This also leads to more esoteric attacks, 
but they are harder to realize in practice. 
2. The use of a CRC-32 checksum for integrity assurance instead of a 
cryptographically secure Message Authenticating Code places the integrity of 
messages at risk. This is not a generally a concern associated with the disclosure 
of the contents of applications messages, but it establishes the possibility of an IP 
re-direction vulnerability that could compromise the entire network.  The effort in 
this case is still moderate and the threat cannot be realized remotely. It requires 
that the adversary have proximate access to the radio communications of the 
wireless network.  
 
In their concluding remarks, the writers describe several countermeasures that can be 
implemented. In general, other authors who have written about wireless security also 
support these actions. They make the following recommendations: 
 
1. As a first priority, the wireless network should be placed outside an organization’s 
perimeter firewall as opposed to connecting behind the firewall. 
2. For access between mobile stations attached to the wireless network and systems 
inside the firewall, they recommend the use of a Virtual Private Network. 
3. The network should be configured to eliminate routes between the wireless 
network and the Internet. However, they do indicate that it may be desirable to 
allow visitors to access the Internet through the wireless network. 
4. Finally, they recommend consideration of improvements in key management that 
results in every wireless station having its own encryption key and that the keys 
be changed frequently. Since this capability is external to the standard it does not 
affect compliance with the standard. However, it does increase the potential for 
interoperability failures and is likely to restrict product selection.   
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Based on the above discussion, and experience of PNNL in operating a pilot wireless 
network with a limited number of access points and stations since the middle of calendar 
year 2000, the following recommendations for network security are offered.  
 
1. Provide a production network that is outside the existing firewall. Because this 
will be considered an insecure network, sensitive information will be prohibited 
from stations accessing the network. 
2. Establish a Virtual Private Network. If staff need to connect back to the internal 
network behind the firewall, utilize a VPN tunnel that overcomes many of the 
problems with the WEP security measures provided on the wireless network. 
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In addition, several additional measures of protection may be provided: 
 
1. Commercial access points from some vendors support more that one logical 
network that is implemented by a separate access point interface or transceiver 
card. This feature can be implemented such that visitors and assignees can be 
assigned to use one of the logical networks and staff can use the other network. 
This will permit use of separate sets of encryption keys for visitors. 
2. The standard supports key schedules per logical network. Access points and 
clients can be individually configured to transmit using any one of the 4 shared 
keys, but can decrypt incoming traffic with any of the 4 keys. It is up to the 
network administrator to determine how many schedules to use for data 
transmission at the access points. Network administrators can rotate the transmit 
key used by the access points without affecting users directly. If only one key is 
used, then all stations on that schedule use the same key. It is advisable to use all 
four key schedules, so there will be a minimum of 4 different keys such that 
compromising one key will only compromise about 25% of the users. Key 
rotation in the access points also makes the attackers task more difficult by 
presenting network traffic with varying keys (i.e., users transmissions are spread 
among  
3. Provide the capability for visitors to access the Internet from their wireless 
stations. Implement static routing so no routes to point to the firewall. Implement 
a second firewall outside the interior firewall and between the wireless LAN and 
the Internet. This firewall can be used to prevent external attacks on access points 
and wireless workstations using the network.   
4. Those visitors and assignees that require access to information located behind the 
firewall will use a route that points to WebGate. WebGate is a web proxy server 
that can allow tightly restricted access to specific web pages following an 
authorization and approval process. Once granted, the user is securely 
authenticated, passes the request to WebGate, and WebGate satisfies the request 
in accordance with an authorization to view table. Connections to WebGate and 
webmail are encrypted also (i.e., https://), thus providing privacy even without 
WEP. 
    
This Appendix was adapted from a document prepared in February 2001 by: 
Robert E. Mahan 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
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